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I. INTRODUCTION 
[I]f a court were to entertain a private claim that a 
regulated rate was unreasonable or unlawful, it would 
necessarily have to second-guess the decisions of the 
agency to whom the legislature has delegated the 
      †  Mr. Decker is a business litigator at Briggs and Morgan, P.A. in 
Minneapolis, Minnesota, with an emphasis in railroad and energy law.  He was 
among a team that represented the electric utility in Hoffman v. Northern States 
Power Co., 743 N.W.2d 751 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008), rev. granted (Minn. Apr. 15, 
2008), discussed infra Part III.B. 
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responsibility to approve rates, and a court generally 
would not have the technical expertise to do so nor the 
capacity to consider the entire rate structure or to balance 
all competing interests.1 
With that recognition, the Minnesota Supreme Court formally 
adopted the “filed-rate doctrine.”  The doctrine protects uniform 
regulatory oversight by curbing lawsuits that implicate a company’s 
“filed rate” (i.e., a mandatory tariff filed with a government agency 
that establishes exclusive charges and services).  Businesses 
immediately affected by the doctrine include railroad, 
telecommunications, gas, electric, and insurance companies that 
must have their tariffs administratively approved.  The upshot for 
such regulated industries is clear: the centralized, uniform 
regulation that compels such entities to offer services on 
government-approved terms will be insulated from the regulatory 
effects of litigation. 
The impact on Minnesota state court litigation will be 
profound.  When applicable, the doctrine signals the end of the 
judicial line for otherwise cognizable claims.  Look no further than 
Schermer, which dismissed a certified class action involving 
potentially thousands of discrimination claimants.2  And just 
recently, the state’s intermediate appellate court rejected a putative 
class action on behalf of allegedly aggrieved electric utility 
ratepayers across Minnesota and the Dakotas.3  In both cases, the 
courts followed the United States Supreme Court’s lead in 
protecting regulatory uniformity by directing the plaintiffs to find 
available relief in the governing agency realm.4 
In the years ahead, regulated defendants will seek to realize 
the doctrine’s ample protections, while plaintiffs will endeavor to 
define its limitations.  With decades of federal precedent as a 
guide, however, history teaches that in Minnesota the doctrine will 
continue to serve its principle purpose: keeping regulation to the 
regulators. 
 1. Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 721 N.W.2d 307, 314 (Minn. 
2006). 
 2. Id. at 311. 
 3. Hoffman v. N. States Power Co., 743 N.W.2d 751, 755–57 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2008), rev. granted (Minn. Apr. 15, 2008). 
 4. See id.; Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 311. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Federal and state laws subject certain industries to regulatory 
oversight.5  The means for such oversight are tariffs that are filed 
with, and then approved and administered by, government 
agencies or commissions.  The tariffs specify the allowable “rates,” 
which by definition include the charges and, often times, the 
services provided by the regulated companies.6 
The United States Supreme Court has dealt with the legal 
ramifications of filed rates for almost a century.  The filed-rate 
doctrine first emerged in the railroad context and then spread to 
other industries subject to regulation by filed tariffs.7  From the 
beginning, the high court has zealously protected the regulatory 
uniformity afforded by tariff schemes by prohibiting private lawsuit 
encroachment. 
Now, the doctrine has taken root in Minnesota.  But what has 
been planted?  What form shall it take?  Only time will tell, but as 
Justice Holmes so aptly observed: “In order to know what [the law] 
is, we must know what it has been and what it tends to become.”8  
When considered in the proper historical context, the looming 
effect of the filed-rate doctrine in Minnesota is evident. 
A. Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. v. Kirby 
The Minnesota Supreme Court traces the doctrine’s origins 
back to 1922,9 but the rationale began percolating in even earlier 
precedents.  Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. v. Kirby10 arose out of a 
railroad-shipper dispute over the transportation of high-grade 
 5. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 717c (2006) (natural gas); 47 U.S.C. § 203 (2006) 
(telecommunications); MINN. STAT. § 70A.06 (2006) (insurance); MINN. STAT. § 
216B.05 (2006) (gas and electric services). 
 6. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2006) (requiring filing of “charges” and all 
“classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such charges”); MINN. STAT. § 
216B.02, subdiv. 5 (2006) (defining “rate” as “every compensation, charge, fare, 
toll, tariff, rental, and classification, or any of them, demanded, observed, charged, 
or collected by any public utility for any service and any rules, practices, or 
contracts affecting” prices or services). 
 7. See infra Part II.A. 
 8. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
 9. Schermer v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 721 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Minn. 
2006) (citing Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922)). 
 10. 225 U.S. 155 (1912).  Given the prevalence of railroad litigants in filed-
rate jurisprudence, such cases will be referenced by the non-railroad party (e.g., 
Kirby). 
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horses.11  Pursuant to the then-prevailing incarnation of the 
Interstate Commerce Act,12 the railroad’s shipping rates (i.e., its 
services and associated charges) had been published in a tariff that 
was on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission.13  The 
commerce act prohibited the railroad from deviating from the 
tariff terms.14 
Standard tariff services were not sufficient for the shipper; 
timeliness concerns demanded that the horses be shipped via a fast 
stock train.15  To accommodate those needs the railroad agreed to 
expedite delivery.16  The railroad ultimately breached the contract 
by getting the horses to their destination after the promised time.17  
A lawsuit to recover damages followed.18 
The Supreme Court rejected the lawsuit, finding that the 
regulatory scheme prohibited the railroad from having to render 
services outside of those required in the published rates.19  The 
demand for expedited service amounted to a prohibited 
“preference or advantage” because no other shipper was privy to 
the extra-tariff service: 
An advantage accorded by special agreement which affects 
the value of the service to the shipper and its cost to the 
carrier should be published in the tariffs; and for a breach 
of such a contract, relief will be denied, because its 
allowance without such publication is a violation of the 
act.  It is also illegal because it is an undue advantage, in 
that it is not one open to all others in the same situation.20 
Thus, even before the phrase “filed-rate doctrine” entered the 
lexicon of regulated commerce, Kirby recognized that a tariff 
 11. Id. at 162–63.   
 12. See generally Rene Sacasas, The Filed Tariff Doctrine: Casualty or Survivor of 
Deregulation?, 29 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1990) (discussing the Interstate Commerce Act 
and surveying the three major phases of federal regulation under the Act). 
 13. Kirby, 225 U.S. at 163.  The Interstate Commerce Commission, which was 
disbanded and absorbed by the Department of Transportation in 1995, was 
established by the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 and regulated surface 
transportation between the states through certification of carriers and pipelines 
and through monitoring quality and pricing.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 839 (8th 
ed. 2004). 
 14. Kirby, 225 U.S. at 163–64. 
 15. Id. at 162. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 162–63. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 164–66. 
 20. Id. at 165. 
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scheme precludes deviation from regulatorily-approved terms.21  
Notably, the damaged party’s ignorance of the published terms was 
of no import: 
That the defendant in error did not see and did not know 
that the published rates and schedules made no provision 
for the service he contracted for, is no defense.  For the 
purposes of the present question he is presumed to have 
known.  The rates were published and accessible, and, 
however difficult to understand, he must be taken to have 
contracted for an advantage not open to others.22 
The rationale’s broad sweep may be startling, but Kirby would 
not be the last time that a tariff would preclude civil litigation from 
compromising the regulatory scheme. 
B. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Maxwell 
The next chapter in the filed-rate saga was Louisville & 
Nashville Railroad Co. v. Maxwell,23 a challenge to tariff-based 
charges.24  The operative facts are straightforward: the tariff 
specified rates for carriage; Maxwell was promised and charged a 
cheaper rate; the railroad sued to recover the undercharge.25  
Maxwell prevailed until the high court weighed in.26 
The Court did not hesitate to enforce the tariff because 
“[u]nder the interstate commerce act, the rate of the carrier duly 
filed is the only lawful charge.  Deviation from it is not permitted 
upon any pretext.”27  The decision echoed Kirby’s strict application 
in favor of uniform regulation: “Shippers and travelers are charged 
with notice, of [the tariff], and they as well as the carrier must 
abide by it, unless it is found by the Commission to be 
unreasonable.”28 
The seemingly unfair impact to Maxwell was acknowledged, 
but not relevant: “This rule is undeniably strict, and it obviously 
 21. Id. at 166 (“To guarantee a particular connection and transportation by a 
particular train was to give an advantage or preference not open to all, and not 
provided for in the published tariffs.”). 
 22. Id. at 166 (citing Tex. & P. R.R. Co. v. Mugg & Dryden, 202 U.S. 242 
(1906)). 
     23.     237 U.S. 94 (1915). 
 24. Id. at 95–96. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. 
 27. Id. at 97. 
 28. Id. 
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may work hardship in some cases, but it embodies the policy which 
has been adopted by Congress in the regulation of interstate 
commerce in order to prevent unjust discrimination.”29  Thus 
Maxwell establishes that tariff-based charges will always prevail, and 
in this sense, the precedent represents the filed-rate doctrine at its 
most basic. 
C. Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. 
Ten years after Kirby first roped-off the regulatory regime from 
judicial action, the Supreme Court made it clear that the 
developing doctrine barred litigation arising out of tariff-related 
matters no matter what form such claims may take.  Keogh v. Chicago 
& Northwestern Railway Co. was an anti-trust action brought by an 
excelsior and flax tow shipper.30  Keogh sued eight railroad 
companies and a dozen individuals whose conspiracy to restrain 
trade had caused damage.31 
Liability on the merits was not a close call: a committee formed 
by the various railroads secured an agreement among competitors 
to fix interstate transportation rates.32  This scheme thereby 
eliminated competition and “interstate commerce was restrained.”33  
The damages suffered by Keogh were not simply theoretical: “[t]he 
uniform rates so established were arbitrary and unreasonable; they 
were higher than those theretofore charged; and they were higher 
than the rates that would have been, if competition had not been 
thus eliminated.”34 
The railroad’s only defense was the filed-rate doctrine.  The 
complained-of rates had been filed with the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, and despite an administrative investigation prompted 
by Keogh’s complaints, the Commission had blessed the pricing 
structure.35  The Supreme Court was called upon to answer whether 
Keogh could seek damages when the “instrument by which Keogh 
is alleged to have been damaged are rates approved by the 
Commission.”36 
 29. Id. 
 30. Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 159 (1922). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 159–60. 
 33. Id. at 160. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 161. 
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The tariff scheme trumped Keogh’s anti-trust protections.  
Writing for the court, Justice Brandeis found that “[a] rate is not 
necessarily illegal because it is the result of a conspiracy in restraint 
of trade in violation of the Anti-Trust Act.”37  Rather, the act only 
affords a “right of action to one who has been injured in his 
business or property” and, importantly, “injury implies violation of 
a legal right.”38  Therein lay the undoing of Keogh’s claims: 
The legal rights of shipper as against carrier in respect to 
a rate are measured by the published tariff.  Unless and 
until suspended or set aside, this rate is made, for all 
purposes, the legal rate, as between carrier and shipper.  
The rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied or 
enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier.39 
In other words, an anti-trust injury could not be pursued if Keogh 
had no legal right to the “competitive” rate upon which the claim 
would be based. 
The Court observed that the net effect of affording Keogh 
recourse would be to grant a rate different from that provided by 
the tariff, thereby giving Keogh an extra-tariff preference over 
other ratepayers.40  The ability of similarly-damaged persons to 
redress like damages made no difference: “[i]t is no answer to say 
that each of these might bring a similar action under [the Anti-trust 
Act].  Uniform treatment would not result, even if all sued, unless 
the highly improbable happened, and the several juries and courts 
gave to each the same measure of relief.”41  Because Keogh lacked a 
right to a rate beyond that provided in the tariff—even though the 
tariff was the product of anti-competitive conduct—the anti-trust 
damages lawsuit could not proceed.42 
D. Davis v. Cornwell 
Justice Brandeis solidified the high court’s tariff jurisprudence 
 37. Id. at 162. 
 38. Id. at 163 (citation omitted). 
 39. Id. (citations omitted). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. (citing Tex. & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 
440 (1907)). 
 42. Id.  The Court did not rule out governmental criminal or injunctive 
redress against the railroads.  Id. at 162 (stating that “[t]he fact that these rates 
had been approved by the Commission would not, it seems, bar proceedings by 
the government”). 
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in Davis v. Cornwell.43  Davis involved a railroad’s promise to provide 
freight cars on a date certain—a term not contemplated by the 
governing tariff.44  When the railroad failed to perform, the shipper 
successfully sued until the case reached the high court.45 
In setting aside the damage award, the Supreme Court 
succinctly summed up the dispositive situation: “The obligation of 
the common carrier implied in the tariff is to use diligence to 
provide, upon reasonable notice, cars for loading at the time 
desired.  A contract to furnish cars on a day certain imposes a 
greater obligation than that implied in the tariff.”46 
The cause of action could not be sustained because the lawsuit 
attempted to impose extra-tariff duties.47  Even though the 
underlying conduct—i.e., the timing of car delivery—was merely 
ancillary to the transportation services that were the true object of 
the tariff, the Court refused to countenance the imposition of 
extra-tariff duties outside of the regulatory scheme: 
[T]hat the thing contracted for in this case was a service 
preliminary to the loading is not a difference of legal 
significance.  The contract to supply cars for loading on a 
day named provides for a special advantage to the 
particular shipper, as much as a contract to expedite the 
cars when loaded.  It was not necessary to prove that a 
preference resulted in fact.  The assumption by the carrier 
of the additional obligation was necessarily a preference.48 
E. Chicago & Northwest Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile   
Co. 
Many years and justices passed through the Supreme Court 
between Davis and Chicago & Northwest Transportation Co. v. Kalo 
Brick & Tile Co.49  Although technically not a filed-rate doctrine 
precedent, Kalo Brick offers insight into the Court’s continuing 
focus on preserving the uniformity and centrality of regulatory 
oversight through administrative filings. 
 43. 264 U.S. 560 (1924). 
 44. Id. at 561. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 562 (“[Kirby] settled that a special contract to transport a car by a 
particular train, or on a particular day, is illegal, when not provided for in the 
tariff.”). 
 48. Id. 
 49. 450 U.S. 311 (1981). 
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Kalo Brick challenged a railroad’s branch line abandonment.50  
The railroad served only one shipper on the line, and the 
abandonment put the shipper out of business.51  Over the shipper’s 
objection, the Interstate Commerce Commission granted the 
railroad’s request to cast off the line due to conditions (a mud 
slide) beyond the railroad’s control.52 
The shipper did not appeal the Commission’s administrative 
decision, but rather sued in state court on various statutory and 
common law grounds, including negligent failure to maintain the 
roadbed and tortious interference with the shipper’s contractual 
relations.53  The state trial court dismissed on preemption grounds, 
but the intermediate appellate court reversed on a theory that the 
federal and state schemes provided “complementary” relief for 
injured persons.54  The state’s high court denied review.55 
Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Marshall 
reversed on federal-preemption grounds in an opinion rife with 
filed-rate doctrine implications.56  For instance, the Court 
characterized the state appellate court decision as amounting “to a 
holding that a state can impose sanctions upon a regulated carrier 
for doing that which only the Commission, acting pursuant to the 
will of Congress, has the power to declare unlawful or 
unreasonable.”57  Indeed, “it is difficult to escape the conclusion 
that the instant litigation represents little more than an attempt by 
a disappointed shipper to gain from the Iowa courts the relief it was 
denied by the Commission.”58 
The high court admonished the complaint as essentially 
charging the railroad with acting “unreasonably” despite the 
administrative approval: 
Respondent in essence seeks to use state law to compel 
petitioner to furnish cars in spite of the congressional 
decision to leave regulation of car service to the 
Commission.  But “the duty to provide cars is not 
absolute,” and the law “exacts only what is reasonable of 
 50. Id. at 314. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 314–15. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 316. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 317–24. 
 57. Id. at 324 (citing Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co., 357 
U.S. 77, 87 (1958)). 
 58. Id. 
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the railroads under the existing circumstances.”59  The 
judgment as to what constitutes reasonableness belongs exclusively 
to the Commission.  It would vitiate the overarching 
congressional intent of creating “an efficient and 
nationally integrated railroad system,” to permit the State 
of Iowa to use the threat of damages to require a carrier to 
do exactly what the Commission is empowered to excuse.  
A system under which each State could, through its courts, 
impose on railroad carriers its own version of reasonable 
service requirements could hardly be more at odds with 
the uniformity contemplated by Congress in enacting the 
Interstate Commerce Act.60 
In the field of regulated commerce, therefore, 
“reasonableness” determinations are for administrative assessment 
and an agency blesses the reasonableness of a “rate” by approving 
the railroad’s filing.  As a result, a post-hoc attack by means of a 
negligence action could not be sustained: 
[T]he questions respondent seeks to raise in the state—
whether roadbed maintenance was negligent or 
reasonable and whether petitioner abandoned its line 
with some tortious motive—are precisely the sort of 
concerns that Congress intended the Commission to 
address in weighing abandonment requests from the 
carriers subject to its regulation.61 
F.  Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall 
A tariff’s terminal effect on litigation was confirmed in 
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, in which the doctrine was 
officially extended beyond the confines of earlier Interstate 
Commerce Act precedents.62  Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. (Arkla) 
purchased natural gas from Frank Hall et al., pursuant to a 1952 
contract that included a fixed price schedule and a “favored 
nations clause.”63  Pursuant to this clause, if Arkla purchased 
natural gas from the same gas field from which Hall was producing, 
 59. Id. at 325 (quoting Milmine Grain Co. v. Norfolk & W. R.R. Co., 352 
I.C.C. 575, 585 (1976) (citing Elgin Coal Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 277 
F. Supp. 247, 250 (E.D. Tenn. 1967))).  See also Midland Valley R.R. Co. v. Barkley, 
276 U.S. 482, 484 (1928). 
 60. Id. at 325–26 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 61. Id. at 326–27. 
 62. 453 U.S. 571, 578–79 (1981). 
 63. Id. at 573. 
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but at a higher rate than Arkla was paying to Hall, then Hall would 
be entitled to a higher price.64  In 1954, Hall filed—and the Federal 
Power Commission (FEP) approved—the Arkla gas purchase 
agreement.65 
Several years later, Arkla purchased certain leaseholds from 
the United States and began producing its own gas from the field 
Hall was using.66  Believing that this transaction invoked the price-
adjustment clause, Hall filed a lawsuit seeking damages equal to the 
difference between the amounts that Arkla had paid and those it 
should have paid assuming the favored nations clause had been 
triggered.67  The district court found that the deal with the United 
States did, in fact, trigger the favored nations clause.68  Nonetheless, 
the filed-rate doctrine precluded an award of damages for 
completed sales.69 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed, finding that Hall 
was entitled to damages between 1961 and 1972 regardless of the 
filed-rate doctrine.70  Shortly after this state supreme court ruling, 
however, the FEP entered the fray by concluding that the allowance 
of damages by the state supreme court violated the filed-rate 
doctrine.71 
Settling the dispute, the United States Supreme Court 
recounted how the filed-rate doctrine had developed through 
Interstate Commerce Act cases, but noted that the rule “has been 
extended across the spectrum of regulated utilities.  ‘The 
considerations underlying the doctrine . . . are preservation of the 
agency’s primary jurisdiction over reasonableness of rates and the 
need to ensure that regulated companies charge only those rates of 
which the agency has been made cognizant.’”72  Protecting agency 
primacy against litigation attacks on regulatory-tariff matters was 
deemed equally applicable in analogous industries like natural gas 
production and sales.73 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 574. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 574–75. 
 70. Id. at 575. 
 71. Id. at 576. 
 72. Id. at 577–78 (quoting City of Cleveland v. FPC, 525 F.2d 845, 854 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976)); see also City of Piqua v. FERC, 610 F.2d 950, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
 73. Id. 
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The requested damages could not be allowed because “[n]ot 
only do the courts lack authority to impose a different rate than the 
one approved by the Commission, but the Commission itself has no 
power to alter a rate retroactively.”74  Consequently: 
It would undermine the congressional scheme of uniform 
rate regulation to allow a state court to award as damages 
a rate never filed with the Commission and thus never 
found to be reasonable within the meaning of the Act.  
Following that course would permit state courts to grant 
regulated sellers greater relief than they could obtain 
from the Commission itself.75 
In short, “[i]t would surely be inconsistent with this congressional 
purpose to permit a state court to do through a breach of contract 
action what the Commission itself may not do.”76 
The seemingly-unfair impact of the Court’s ruling was 
emphasized in Justice Powell’s dissent: “Despite the fact that Arkla 
breached its contract, and despite the fact that no federal policy is 
threatened by allowing the Louisiana courts to redress that breach, 
the Court today denies respondents the benefit of their lawful 
bargain.”77  Nonetheless, the filed-rate doctrine prevailed. 
G. AT&T v. Central Office Telephone, Inc. 
As much as Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. represents the “rate” 
aspect of the filed-rate doctrine, AT&T v. Central Office Telephone 
Inc.78 addresses the “services” called for by filed rates.  When the 
filed-rate doctrine is brought to bear, the result for litigation is the 
same. 
AT&T arose out of a dispute between the provider (AT&T) 
and a reseller (Central Office) of long-distance 
telecommunications services.79  Central Office complained that 
contracted-for order fillings and account billings were late and that 
other agreed-upon service options had not been delivered.80  The 
tariff covered provisioning and billing duties by committing those 
service-related responsibilities to AT&T’s discretion: 
 74. Id. at 578. 
 75. Id. at 579. 
 76. Id. at 580. 
 77. Id. at 586 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 78. 524 U.S. 214 (1998). 
 79. Id. at 216–20. 
 80. Id. at 220. 
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[W]hereas [Central Office] asks to enforce a guarantee 
that orders would be provisioned within 30 to 90 days, the 
tariff leaves it up to [AT&T] to “establis[h] and 
confir[m]” a due date for provisioning, requires that 
petitioner merely make “every reasonable effort” to meet 
that due date, and if it fails gives the customer no recourse 
except to “cancel the order without penalty or payment of 
nonrecurring charges.”81 
Although AT&T’s obligations were established by the tariff, the 
district court allowed Central Office’s lawsuit to proceed.82  
Enforcing what was deemed to be an AT&T contractual 
commitment, the jury awarded $13 million in lost profits (later 
sliced to $1.154 million).83 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the lost profits award 
without regard to the published tariff, believing that “this case does 
not involve rates or rate-setting, but rather involves the provisioning 
of services and billing.”84  Moreover, the circuit court sent the case 
back to the district court for a punitive damages assessment.85 
The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s rates-versus-
services dichotomy: 
Rates . . . do not exist in isolation.  They have meaning 
only when one knows the services to which they are 
attached.  Any claim for excessive rates can be couched as 
a claim for inadequate services and vice versa.  “If 
‘discrimination in charges’ does not include non-price 
features, then the carrier could defeat the broad purpose 
of the statute by the simple expedient of providing an 
additional benefit at no additional charge . . . .  An 
unreasonable ‘discrimination in charges,’ that is, can 
come in the form of a lower price for an equivalent service 
or in the form of an enhanced service for an equivalent 
price.”86 
Invoking the earliest tariff-related precedents, Justice Scalia 
reminded that challenges to tariff-provided services offend the 
filed-rate doctrine just as much as attacks on tariff-approved 
pricing: 
 81. Id. at 225. 
 82. Id. at 221. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Cent. Office Tel., Inc. v. AT&T, 108 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 85. Id. 
 86. AT&T, 524 U.S. at 223 (quoting Competitive Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 
998 F.2d 1058, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). 
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In Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U.S. 155, 32 S. Ct. 
648, 56 L. Ed. 1033 (1912), we rejected a shipper’s breach-
of-contract claim against a railroad for failure to ship a 
carload of race horses by a particularly fast train.  We held 
that the contract was invalid as a matter of law because the 
carrier’s tariffs “did not provide for an expedited service, 
nor for transportation by any particular train,” and 
therefore the shipper received “an undue advantage . . . 
that is not one open to others in the same situation.”  
Similarly, in Davis v. Cornwell, 264 U.S. 560 (1924), we 
invalidated the carrier’s agreement to provide the shipper 
with a number of railroad cars on a specified day; such a 
special advantage, we said, “is illegal, when not provided 
for in the tariff.”87 
AT&T left no doubt that ratepayers cannot elude the filed-rate 
bar by pleading “services” claims; challenges to rates and claims 
against services are two sides of the same coin for filed-rate 
purposes.  In both cases, respect for agency jurisdiction requires 
that courts dismiss tariff-related complaints. 
III. MINNESOTA EMBRACES THE FILED-RATE DOCTRINE 
With the trail blazed by the likes of Kirby, Keogh, and AT&T, 
the Minnesota courts were not faced with a daunting 
jurisprudential leap.  Nonetheless, the impact of the Schermer court 
formally adopting the filed-rate doctrine cannot be overstated: the 
precedent definitively reset the balance between regulated entities 
and their would-be litigation adversaries. 
A. Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 
1. Background 
Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. arose out of an 
insurance dispute.88  Insurance rates, like railroad, gas, and 
telecommunications rates, are subject to tariff filings.89  The 
Minnesota Department of Commerce (DOC) exclusively decides 
whether an insurer’s proposed rates are “excessive, inadequate or 
 87. Id. at 224 (citations omitted). 
 88. Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 721 N.W.2d 307, 307 (Minn. 
2006). 
 89. MINN. STAT. § 70A.06, subdiv. 1 (2006). 
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unfairly discriminatory.”90  One statute in particular—subdivision 
13(b) to section 72A.20 of the Minnesota Statutes—prohibits rate 
discrimination on the basis of the age of the structure to be 
insured. 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (State Farm) filed an 
insurance rate plan with the DOC on May 8, 1997.91  That plan gave 
some homeowners a discount and imposed a surcharge on others 
based upon the age of the home’s electrical wiring.92  Homes with 
electrical systems eight years old and newer received varying 
discounts; homes with electrical systems between nine and thirty-
nine years old received no discount or surcharge; and homes with 
systems thirty-nine years and older paid a six percent surcharge.93 
Tying the discount/surcharge to the age of the electrical 
system was no accident: State Farm sought to satisfy an exception to 
section 72A.20, which provides that while insurance rates may not 
be based solely on the age of the primary structure, the age of the 
electrical system may be considered to the extent that factor 
reflects a risk of loss.94  In fact, however, the actuarial data that State 
Farm relied upon to show that older electrical systems increase risk 
encompassed all non-catastrophic losses rather than those directly 
related to older electrical systems.95  Despite this apparent illogic, 
the rate plan was approved on July 23, 1997.96 
Years after the DOC approval, a State Farm policyholder 
received a premium increase notice based upon the age of the 
electrical system.97  The policyholder complained to the DOC, and 
State Farm was required to produce supporting actuarial data.98  
State Farm eventually conceded that it lacked “electrical system 
cause-of-loss data to support” the rate surcharge.99  The DOC 
subsequently found State Farm’s rate to be based upon structure 
age and, therefore, violative of section 72A.20, subdivision 13(b).  A 
consent decree followed, in which State Farm denied the 
allegations but agreed to cease and desist.100 
 90. Id. § 70A.04, subdiv. 1. 
 91. Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 310. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. MINN. STAT. § 72A.20, subdiv. 13(b) (2006). 
 95. Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 310. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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2. The Doctrine is Brought to Bear 
Within days of the consent decree, a putative class action was 
filed.101  The Schermer class was certified to include all insurance 
policyholders who had paid surcharges based upon the now-
rejected rate plan.102  The class alleged “that [a] surcharge that was 
imposed by [the insurer] on homes whose electrical systems were 
more than 39 years old was racially discriminatory.”103  The lawsuit 
sought a refund of all impermissible surcharges.104 
The insurer moved for summary judgment on filed-rate 
doctrine grounds.105  The district court obliged, finding that “the 
filed-rate doctrine prevents a court from retroactively changing a 
rate that has been filed with and approved by a state regulatory 
agency.”106  The intermediate appellate court affirmed.107 
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court, the class declared the 
filed-rate doctrine to be inapplicable “because their challenge is 
not to the reasonableness of the [tariff that had been filed with the 
responsible agency], but to its legality, which is a matter within the 
peculiar expertise of courts.”108  Also, damages were said to be 
“judicially ascertainable.”109  Both contentions came up short. 
The Schermer court began by noting that the United States 
Supreme Court had not committed to one filed-rate doctrine 
rationale.110  The doctrine sounded in “separation of powers” when 
turning upon a legislative body conferring upon an administrative 
agency exclusive authority to determine the reasonableness of a 
particular rate.111  Simultaneously, justiciability concerns are piqued 
because “a court is not well suited to determine, if the rate 
approved by the commission were found to be unlawful, what other 
rate the commission would find to be reasonable and non-
discriminatory to take its place.”112  In that vein, Schermer endorsed 
an observation from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals: 
 101. Id. at 311. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 309. 
 104. Id. at 311. 
 105. Id. at 309. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 314. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 311–12. 
 111. Id. at 312. 
 112. Id. (citing Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 164–65 (1922)). 
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[R]egulatory agencies have special expertise, investigative 
capacities, and experience and familiarity with the 
regulated industry that enable them to “consider the 
whole picture regarding the reasonableness of a proposed 
rate,” whereas the courts are ill-suited to second-guess the 
decisions of regulatory agencies.113 
The Schermer court reasoned that “the filed-rate doctrine 
should reflect separation of powers and comity considerations 
[which] the Class’s argument overlooks.”114  With regard to 
separation of powers, the court recognized that “ratemaking is a 
legislative function.”115  Succinctly put: 
[I]f a court were to entertain a private claim that a 
regulated rate was unreasonable or unlawful, it would 
necessarily have to second-guess the decisions of the 
agency to whom the legislature has delegated the 
responsibility to approve rates, and a court generally 
would not have the technical expertise to do so nor the 
capacity to consider the entire rate structure or to balance 
all competing interests.116 
The Schermer court likewise adopted the justiciability rationale, 
finding that “courts are ill-equipped to retroactively reallocate rates 
among ratepayers, by modifying the rates for some ratepayers but 
not for others.”117  Further, “the regulation of rates is an ‘intricate 
ongoing process’ and interference by a court ‘may set in motion an 
ever-widening set of consequences and adjustments’ which courts 
are powerless to address.”118  Thus consistent with the foundational 
filed-rate jurisprudence, the Schermer court recognized and 
defended the uniformity and centrality of regulation intended by 
tariff mechanisms.119 
 113. Id. (accord Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 20, 21 (2d Cir. 
1994)).  Although filed-rate jurisprudence was born in the federal courts, the 
Schermer court recognized that the doctrine applies equally to rates filed with state 
agencies.  Id.  Indeed, the court noted that in such cases the doctrine is a matter of 
state law (albeit the Schermer court heavily relied upon United States Supreme 
Court precedents).  Id. at 312–13. 
 114. Id. at 314. 
 115. Id. (citing Nw. Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 299 Minn. 1, 28, 216 N.W.2d 841, 857 
(1974) (citation omitted)). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 315 (citing Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 
369 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Minn. 1985)). 
 118. Id. (quoting Peoples Natural Gas, 369 N.W.2d at 535). 
 119. Id. 
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3. No Exceptions 
Faced with legal peril, the class urged that the filed-rate 
doctrine cannot trump the lawsuit because the Minnesota 
Constitution guarantees “a certain remedy in the laws for all 
injuries or wrongs.”120  Unpersuaded, the Schermer court concluded 
that the comprehensive regulatory scheme protected the class 
members and all ratepayers.121 
The Minnesota State Constitution only preserves “remedies for 
which the legislature has not provided a reasonable substitute.”122  
The court found such a reasonable substitute in the pervasive 
administrative oversight: 
The statutes that regulate insurance companies in general 
and rates in particular—including the rate filing 
requirements, the DOC review requirements, the DOC 
investigative responsibilities, and the DOC and district 
court enforcement capabilities—provide remedies that 
ensure protection of the interests of ratepayers.  In fact, 
the collective requirements of those statutes relieve 
individual ratepayers of the burden of reviewing, 
monitoring, or challenging rates and, instead, charge the 
DOC with the responsibility to assure ratepayers that rates 
will not be excessive.  This regulatory scheme is a 
reasonable substitute for the common law claim that the 
Class will be prevented from asserting.123 
The Schermer court countenanced no exceptions to the 
doctrine despite acknowledging that other courts have found no 
filed-rate bar when: 
 
• A rate filed with a state regulatory agency violates a 
federal anti-discrimination statute;124 
 
• The regulatory agency’s review was minimal;125 or 
 
 120. Id. at 316 (quoting MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8). 
 121. Id. at 316–17. 
 122. Id. at 316 (quoting Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 
14 (Minn. 1986)). 
 123. Id. at 316–17. 
 124. Id. at 317 (citing Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440 F.3d 940, 944–45 
(8th Cir. 2006)). 
 125. Id. (citing Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 393–94 (9th Cir. 
1992)). 
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• Fiduciary duty breaches are present.126 
 
Taking a cue from the Ninth Circuit, the Schermer class 
contended that an exception for filed rates should apply because 
agency review of insurance rates is “passive.”127  The court 
disagreed, finding that insurance pricing in Minnesota is subject to 
“meaningful review” because the insurance commissioner is 
charged with enforcing the laws, insurers must file all rates with the 
commissioner, and the rates cannot be “excessive, inadequate, or 
unfairly discriminatory.”128  The DOC is also responsible for 
“examin[ing] the affairs and conditions of every insurer licensed in 
the state not less frequently than once every five years.”129  Although 
“the insurance regulatory scheme is less stringent than, for 
example, the scheme for electrical, gas, and telephone utilities . . . 
this difference in degree of regulation is one that the legislature 
has chosen and it does not materially impact the rationale for the 
filed rate doctrine.”130  Therefore, the case had to be dismissed. 
B. Hoffman v. Northern States Power Co. 
1. Background 
With Schermer’s broad and dispositive holding in place, the 
question remained as to how Minnesota courts would give effect to 
the principle.  The first appellate application—Hoffman v. Northern 
States Power Co.—embraced an expansive approach.131 
Hoffman is an electricity case.132  Like their counterparts in 
railroad, gas, telecommunications, and insurance businesses, 
electric utilities must file tariffs setting forth the “rates” and “all 
rules that, in the judgment of the [Minnesota Public Utilities 
 126. Id. (citing Am. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 818 So. 2d 1073, 1085 (Miss. 
2001), overruled on other grounds by Capital City Ins. Co. v. G.B. “Boots” Smith Corp., 
889 So. 2d 505 (Miss. 2004)).  The Schermer court expressly refused to address 
whether a claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act might vitiate the filed-
rate doctrine.  Id. at 317 n.6.  See also MINN. STAT. § 363A.33 (2006). 
 127. Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 317. 
 128. Id. at 318 (quotations and citations omitted). 
 129. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 60A.031, subdiv. 1 (2006)). 
 130. Id. 
 131. See generally Hoffman v. N. States Power Co., 743 N.W.2d 751 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2008), rev. granted (Minn. Apr. 15, 2008).  The Minnesota Supreme Court has 
not yet set the case for argument.   
 132. Id. 
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Commission (MPUC)], in any manner affect the service or 
product.”133  The MPUC is statutorily vested with exclusive authority 
to assess the “reasonableness” of the tariff.134  Once in effect, 
electric utilities cannot sell or distribute electricity except as 
provided for in the tariff.135 
The Hoffman complaint stemmed from a dispute over the 
“point of connection” between Northern States Power Company’s 
(NSP) wires and the customers’ homes. 
According to respondents, NSP initially connects a 
customer to its system by affixing wires to lugs within the 
customer’s meter box.  After securing this connection, 
NSP installs a seal on the meter box to prevent access by 
the customer, a measure provided for in the tariffs.  
Respondents contend that over time these connections 
can become corroded, loose, or both, causing a fire 
hazard.  They argue that NSP is obligated under the tariffs 
to inspect and maintain its electrical wiring up through 
and including this connection point.136 
 The lawsuit was filed as a putative class action on behalf of all 
residential NSP electric customers in Minnesota, North Dakota, 
and South Dakota.137 
2. Schermer is Enforced 
NSP invoked the filed-rate doctrine, but had to go to the 
appeals court to realize its protections.138  In short, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals concluded that the regulatory implications of 
allowing the litigation to proceed triggered the filed-rate doctrine 
as adopted in Schermer.139 
The appeals court surveyed Schermer’s boundaries with the 
jurisprudence upon which the precedent had been based: 
The filed-rate doctrine, as applied by the United States 
Supreme Court for more than a century, forbids a 
regulated entity from charging its customers a rate other 
than the one duly filed with the appropriate regulatory 
 133. MINN. STAT. § 216B.05, subdiv. 2 (2006). 
 134. Id. § 216A.05, subdiv. 2(2). 
 135. Id. §§ 216B.06, 216B.07. 
 136. Hoffman, 743 N.W.2d at 753.  Hoffman was decided on the pleadings, so 
those allegations had to be regarded as true.  See id. 
 137. Id. at 752. 
 138. See id. at 757. 
 139. Id. 
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authority . . . .  This preclusion against suit extends to 
claims challenging the services provided in exchange for a 
filed rate.140 
The appellate court found no filed-rate reason to distinguish 
the insurance industry from the electric utility industry.141  Nor did 
the court find an important distinction in that the Hoffman 
plaintiffs “do not seek a refund of the rate paid, but rather contract 
damages for the value of services promised but not provided.”142  
Further, the appeals court affirmed the filed-rate doctrine 
understanding that the form of a claim or relief does not control 
the analysis: 
We reject this latter distinction as no more than semantic.  
In determining the application of the filed-rate doctrine, 
our focus is on “the impact the court’s decision will have 
on agency procedures and rate determinations.”  And, 
here, as in Schermer, respondents underestimate the extent 
to which a judicial decision in their favor would interfere 
with rate-making.  Whether properly characterized as a 
request for additional services or enforcement of the tariff 
“as it stands,” respondents’ claims will inevitably impact 
the rate-making process between NSP and the MPUC.  
Public-utility rate setting is a complex process, involving 
the agency’s review and careful balancing of multiple 
factors affecting the regulated entity’s appropriate rate of 
return.  A judgment from the court in this matter—
whether or not it merely construes the tariff—will 
interfere with the rate-making process.143 
Consistent with the emphasis on the effect that prosecuting a 
civil remedy could have on the filed-rate structure, the appellate 
court also rejected the suggestion that a claim that merely seeks to 
enforce the terms of a tariff should not be barred by the filed-rate 
doctrine.144  The court acknowledged “a split among federal 
 140. Id. at 755 (citing H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 488 (8th Cir. 
1992); AT&T v. Cent. Office Tel. Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 223 (1998) (citations 
omitted)).  The appellate court made it clear that the doctrine was not merely 
statutory: “the supreme court emphasized the separation-of-powers purposes 
underlying the filed-rate doctrine, noting that ‘ratemaking is a legislative 
function.’”  Id. (quoting Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 314) (citation omitted)). 
 141. Id. at 756. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. (citations omitted). 
 144. Id.  The claimants were relying on at least two other cases decided on 
federal-law grounds.  See Brown v. MCI Worldcom Network Servs, Inc., 277 F.3d 
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authorities as to whether the doctrine precludes claims that are 
seeking no more than interpretation and enforcement of the terms 
of a tariff.”145  But the Brown-line of thinking was rebuffed because 
such decisions do not explain “how such a claim is any less invasive 
upon the administrative rate-making process.  Nor do they address 
the separation-of-powers principles that the supreme court found 
crucial in Schermer.”146 
The MPUC, not the courts, have the exclusive say: 
As the agency charged by statute with approving rates, 
MPUC is in the best position to determine whether the 
point of connection must be maintained and, if so, by 
whom.  If respondents petitioned MPUC to hold that NSP 
must maintain the points of connection, and MPUC 
concluded in respondents’ favor, it is also the entity with 
the power to consider the costs of such a burden, adjust 
the rate accordingly, and enforce that rate.147 
IV. THE ROAD AHEAD 
The filed-rate doctrine may be new to Minnesota, but it arrives 
battle tested.  No less an authority than the United States Supreme 
Court has poked and prodded the theory from Kirby through 
AT&T.  If a law may be understood by “know[ing] what it has been 
and what it tends to become,”148 there is little doubt that Schermer 
forecasts rough seas for litigation efforts that intrude upon the 
administrative oversight of regulated commerce. 
Consider the genealogy: 
 
• Kirby: company cannot be held liable to provide 
services beyond the tariff despite agreement to do 
more.149 
 
1166, 1166 (9th Cir. 2002); Lipton v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 182, 
182 (D.D.C. 2001). 
 145. Id. at 754 (comparing H.J., 954 F.2d at 488 with Brown, 277 F.3d at 1166).  
The appellate court noted that federal authorities do not control the analysis 
because the filed-rate doctrine is a matter of state law.  Id. at 756. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. HOLMES, supra note 8. 
 149. Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U.S. 155, 163–66 (1912).  See supra 
Part II.A. 
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• Maxwell: tariff trumps contractual duty.150 
 
• Keogh: anti-trust duties cannot be enforced once 
complained-of conduct has been covered by 
regulatorily-approved tariffs.151  Specifically, “[t]he 
rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied or 
enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier.”152 
 
• Davis: duty to provide railroad cars on a date certain 
unenforceable (despite agreement to do so) because 
such services were not tariff-required.153 
 
• Kalo Brick: courts may neither impose a roadbed 
maintenance duty nor probe for tortious motivations 
when railroad proceeded pursuant to regulatorily-
approved plan.154 
 
• Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.: lawsuit precluded because 
assumption that the regulatory agency would find 
damages to be “reasonable” is wholly speculative.155 
 
• AT&T: no damages for breach of contract or tortious 
interference because regulated utility’s service 
obligations are limited to the filed tariff regardless of 
contrary promises.156   
 
Once the Minnesota Supreme Court accepted the prevailing 
rationale, the result in Schermer was a foregone conclusion.  After 
all, the Schermer plaintiffs sought damages equal to the amount of a 
 150. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 96–97 (1915).  See 
supra Part II.B. 
 151. Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 162–64 (1922).  See supra 
Part II.C. 
 152. Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163 (citations omitted). 
 153. Davis v. Cornwell, 264 U.S. 560, 561–62 (1924).  See supra Part II.D. 
 154. Chicago and Nw. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile, Co., 450 U.S. 311, 324–
27 (1981).  See also supra Part II.E. 
 155. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577–82 (1981).  See 
supra Part II.F. 
 156. AT&T v. Cent. Office Tel. Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 223–25 (1998).  See supra 
Part II.G. 
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discriminatory surcharge.157  If such damages were awarded, the 
Schermer plaintiffs effectively would have paid a rate for insurance 
services lower than that set forth in the regulatory tariff.  The result 
is a quintessential filed-rate doctrine transgression.158 
The same goes for the Hoffman litigants.  Those plaintiffs 
sought to enforce the tariff as they saw it, and felt that the courts 
could simply calculate the value of the services to which they 
believed they were entitled, but had been denied.159  Again, the 
court refused to meddle in MPUC tariff affairs because of the 
regulatory disformity that would be wrought.160  The tariff scheme 
could not be unsettled by a damages award. 
Importantly, the filed-rate doctrine does not only apply when 
damages are analogous to some form of a rebate as in Schermer and 
Hoffman.  The horseman in Kirby sought compensation for the 
damages he sustained when he did not receive the services for 
which he had bargained.161  So, too, did the telecommunications 
reseller in AT&T seek compensation for lost profits.162  What 
mattered in those cases was not that the plaintiffs sought a refund 
of rates paid, but rather that they sought to hold the regulated 
entity liable for failing to fulfill a duty not provided for in the tariff.  
Litigation that effectively demands extra-tariff efforts is thus equally 
repelled by the historical doctrine. 
Undoubtedly, the filed-rate doctrine will get much play in the 
Minnesota courts in the coming years.  While it remains to be seen 
whether the courts will keep the doctrine whole or begin 
embracing exceptions, it is clear that the balance in tariff-related 
litigation has shifted toward regulatory uniformity and away from 
regulation-by-litigation. 
 157. Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 721 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Minn. 
2006). 
 158. See, e.g., Ark. La. Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 579 (“It would undermine the 
congressional scheme of uniform rate regulation to allow a state court to award as 
damages a rate never filed with the Commission and thus never found to be 
reasonable within the meaning of the Act.”); Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 
U.S. 156, 163 (1922) (stating that “[i]f a shipper could recover . . . damages 
resulting from the exaction of a rate higher than that which would otherwise have 
prevailed, the amount recovered might, like a rebate, operate to give him a 
preference over his trade competitors”). 
 159. Hoffman v. N. States Power Co., 743 N.W.2d 751, 752 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2008). 
 160. Id. at 755. 
 161. Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U.S. 155, 162–63 (1912). 
 162. American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel. Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 220–21 
(1998). 
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